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Abstract: Theories of relative deprivation predict negative welfare effects when 
friends and neighbors become better-off.  Other theories point to likely positive 
benefits.  We test for perceived welfare effects of relative deprivation in one of 
the world’s poorest countries, Malawi, using data and methods that help address 
likely biases in past tests. We find that relative deprivation is not a concern for 
most of our sample, although it is for the comparatively well off. Our results 
provide a welfarist explanation for the high priority given to absolute poverty in 
poor countries.  The pattern of externalities suggests that there will be too much 
poverty and inequality from the point of view of aggregate efficiency.   
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1. Introduction 
Discussions about how best to fight poverty in poor countries have typically focused on 
peoples’ absolute levels of living, as measured by their command over commodities.  This focus 
is at odds with a large body of work in sociology, social psychology and economics arguing that 
relative economic position is the carrier of utility, not absolute consumption; this is often called 
the theory of ‘relative deprivation’ (RD), following Runciman (1966).
2  The importance of RD 
has long been debated in economics, though early discussions had little or no empirical evidence 
to draw upon.
3 More recently, evidence of RD has come from a variety of sources, though almost 
solely for developed countries.
4  An overview of the evidence concludes that: 
“In sum, the claim that satisfaction depends heavily on relative position is supported by 
considerable evidence from both the psychological literature on subjective well-being and by at 
least fragmentary evidence from the behavioural economics literature. I am aware of no empirical 
or theoretical evidence against the claim.” (Frank, 1997, p.1836)  
 
Finding evidence of RD effects in poor countries as strong as those found in rich ones 
would cast serious doubt on the welfare-economic justifications for many current development 
policies.  Consider, for example, Luttmer’s (2005) striking finding in regressions for self-
assessed happiness in the US that the coefficients on log income and log mean ‘neighbors’ 
income add up to roughly zero.  This implies that an equal proportionate increase in all incomes 
(leaving relative inequality unchanged) would have no impact on average happiness.  A result as 
strong as this would clearly lead one to question the emphasis currently placed on promoting 
                                                 
2    There is a large literature; other contributions include Easterlin (1974, 1995), Townsend (1979), 
van de Stadt et al., (1985), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Frank (1985, 1997), Oswald (1997), Solnick and 
Hemenway (1998), Walker and Smith (2001) and Alpizar et al. (2005).   
3   See, for example, Becker’s (1974) discussion of the differing views of Adam Smith and Thorstein 
Veblan concerning (in effect) the welfare relevance of RD.  
4   In a well-known example, Easterlin (1974) used RD to explain why the proportion of people who 
think they are happy has not changed much over time in the US, despite economic growth. Also see 
Oswald (1997) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2004). Evidence from micro data is reviewed by Oswald 
(1997) and Frank (1997); we cite example later.       4
economic growth in poor countries.  Negative externalities in consumption from RD would also 
suggest that poor people face inefficiently high incentives to escape poverty, because they do not 
take account of the negative spillover effects of their income gains on social comparators.  By 
this view, promoting poverty reduction would entail welfare efficiency costs — pointing to a 
potentially important trade-off for development policy. 
At a conceptual level, one can agree in principle that poverty is absolute in the space of 
‘welfare,’ but relative in the space of commodities.  To make that idea operational in a 
scientifically credible way we need to be able to identify how individual welfare is affected by 
relativity incomes or consumptions.  Here we follow a long tradition in economics of identifying 
‘welfare’ with utility, though we acknowledge that this is by not universally accepted; in 
particular, Amartya Sen argues that for the purpose of measuring poverty, ‘welfare’ should be 
defined in terms of ‘capabilities’ not ‘utilities;’ see, for example, Sen (1983).
5   
There are some clues about the possible important of RD from qualitative work. Drawing 
on village-level observations, Rao (2001) argues that perceptions of ‘status and rank’ matter in 
rural India.  Similarly, some of the qualitative reports from field work found in Narayan and 
Petesch (2002) are suggestive of concerns about status and position.
6  While such field studies 
can be insightful, they offer no guidance on the quantitative importance of RD, and they contain 
ambiguities about even its qualitative importance to poor people relative to other factors.
7  
Rigorous quantitative evidence on this issue for poor countries has been virtually non-existent. 
                                                 
5   These views are not mutually exclusive. We can interpret a standard utility function defined on 
commodities and personal characteristics as a derived function, obtained by substituting a model of the 
functionings relevant to capabilities into a (primal) utility function defined on those functionings; see 
Ravallion (2005) for a more formal treatment.   
6   Writing about poor people in Nigeria it is claimed that, “In addition to material deprivation, the 
people … speak of lacking dignity, status, security and hope” (Narayan and Petesch, 2002, p.107).   
7   For example, in the quote from Narayan and Petesch in the last footnote, it can be argued that 
‘security’ is a positive external effect of higher group welfare not a negative one, as in RD.    5
Other theories and evidence point in a different direction, by suggesting how poor people 
can share in economic gains to friends and neighbors.  Risk sharing arrangements are prominent 
in the development literature, given the uninsured risks and prospects of falling into permanent 
destitution.
8  Communities can also be important institutions for providing employment and local 
public goods — generating positive externalities for the poor in relatively well-off areas.
9  
Positive externalities may arise via one’s current economic welfare or be an independent effect, 
such as through greater personal security in the presence of uninsured risks.  Since it is repeated 
interpersonal interaction that facilitates both social comparison and mutual support or collective 
action, it is not surprising that these conceptually distinct theoretical perspectives point to similar 
social groups — neighbors, friends, co-workers — as the generators of the external effects.       
This paper provides direct tests for RD in one of the world’s poorest countries, Malawi. 
Almost 90% of Malawi’s population lives in rural areas, where the vast majority of households 
are small-holders who depend heavily on rain-fed, highly risk-prone and seasonal, traditional 
agriculture.
10  In the late 1990s, roughly two-thirds of the population lived in households with 
consumption per person below the country’s poverty line (National Economic Council, 2000).  
Yet income inequality is relatively high, with a Gini index around 0.50 (World Bank, 2005a).  As 
in any risk-prone and poor rural economy there are various forms of informal insurance and 
social assistance in rural Malawi.  An example is the widespread local institution called ganyu, 
whereby households in current need are provided some form of unskilled piecework in return for 
                                                 
8   There is a large literature assessing the safety-net role of private transfers and other forms of 
support in poor countries; see, for example, Ravallion and Dearden (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993), 
Murgai et al. (2002), Ligon et al., (2002), Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Maitra and Ray (2003) and Cox et 
al. (2004). There is also evidence of such effects amongst poor families in the US (Ribar, 2005). 
9   For an interesting perspective on the role of communities see Bowles and Gintis (2002).  In a 
development context, see Mansuri and Rao (2004). Jalan and Ravallion (2002) find evidence of positive 
externalities for poor rural households living in areas with better-off neighbors (in southwest China).  
10   Broader discussions of poverty in Malawi can be found in Ellis et al., (2003) and Peters (2004).   6
food or cash, typically by better-off benefactors within the community.  It seems that Ganyu is 
often more than simply a labor-market transaction, but is a form of social assistance within 
communities, embedded in established and reciprocal relationships.
11 This is clearly an important 
source of positive external effects for poor people in Malawi, as long as they have better-off 
friends and neighbors to turn to.  But is it more important than RD? 
We begin by asking when RD will be the dominate welfare effect in a simple model 
combining informal risk-sharing with the idea of a ‘positional good.’ Under certain conditions, 
the direction of the welfare effect will reverse sign as income rises, with RD only emerging as 
the dominant concern at high incomes.  The model motivates our tests for Malawi.  We offer an 
empirical method of testing for RD that helps address the main problems that have clouded 
inferences in past work.  After discussing the sources of bias in past tests (section3), we describe 
our data and methods (section 4).  Section 5 presents our results; we find that for Malawi’s poor, 
the positive effects of better-off friends and neighbors dominate concerns about RD.  However, 
we do find evidence of RD effects at higher level of living. The positive externalities are largely 
confined to rural areas, while (for at least some specifications) the negative externality from RD 
is the dominant social effect in urban areas.  Section 6 presents our main conclusions. 
 
2.  An encompassing model 
Our empirical work will study the relationship between survey responses on overall 
satisfaction with life (interpreted as an indicator of utility) and various measures of the material 
standard of living (‘economic welfare’) of both the respondent and comparison groups.  In other 
words, we aim to estimate a utility function,  ) , (
n y y v , which depends on own-income, y and 
                                                 
11   See Englund (1999), Whiteside (2000) and Mtika (2001); with reference to ganyu, Whiteside 
writes that “Providing food in exchange for work may be as much a social obligation for those with food 
as a response to work needing doing” (p.2).    7
income of (say) ‘neighbors,’
n y .  Before delving into the estimation problems and data it is of 
interest to see how such a utility function can be derived from more primitive choice-theoretic 
assumptions.  To do this we assume that an informal risk-sharing arrangement exists amongst a 
set of self-interested individuals.  We consider two homogeneous groups, one of which draws the 
income y while the other gets
n y .  The risk-sharing arrangement is in place prior to the 
realization of an uncertain process which assigns people to these groups at each date.  The 
incomes are random variable, reflecting the risks faced in a (largely rural) developing economy.   
To derive  ) , (
n y y v , let utility depend on the quantities consumptions of two composite 
commodities,  1 X  and  2 X .  Utility from  1 X  depends on one’s own consumption, but for  2 X  it 
depends on consumption relative to the other group, making it a ‘positional good.’  One can 
think of  1 X  as a good which is consumed in private while consumption of  2 X  is public 
knowledge within the community and so it gives status in the specific social context, leading to 
consumption rivalries.  
Utility is  ) , ( 2 2 1
n X X X u −  when neighbors consume 
n X 2  of the positional good.
12  Utility 
is strictly increasing and quasi-concave and the budget constraint is: 
   Y y y y pX X
n = + = + ) , ( 2 1 τ         ( 1 )  
where  ) , (
n y y τ  is the monetary value of the support (in cash or kind) received by a person with 
pre-transfer income y in  ] , [
max min y y  when the neighbors have the pre-transfer income 
n y . (We 
use lower case y to denote pre-transfer income and upper case Y for post-transfer and similarly 
for 
n y  and 
n Y .)  We assume that  0 ) , ( >
n y y τ  if 
n y y <  and  0 ) , ( ) , ( = + y y y y
n n τ τ . 
                                                 
12   Notice that we assume that it is the difference 
n X X 2 2 −  that matters not the ratio
n X X 2 2 /.   T h a t  
is not essential, though it simplifies the analytics.       8
The function τ  is decided prior to knowing the actual state-specific incomes, with 
consumption choices being made in each realized state of nature, taking the transfers as given.  
The folk theorem can be used to motivate this risk-sharing arrangement as the outcome of a 
repeated non-cooperative game in which defectors are penalized by being excluded from the 
game for ever after.  Full risk-sharing (income-pooling) requires that  y y y y
n n − = ) , ( τ , so that 
everyone ends up with 
n y .
13  However, to be feasible, the transfers must satisfy the constraint 
that the gain from continued participation in the risk-sharing arrangement is no less than the gain 
from defection.  When full-risk sharing is not attainable, the equilibrium  ) , (
n y y τ  is the 
maximum amount that can be taken from the person with higher realized income without 
inducing defection, given the cost of that defection (Coate and Ravallion, 1993).
14 
There are other possible interpretations of  ) , (
n y y τ .  The positive externality of a higher 
n y  might arise instead from the financing arrangements for a local public good, the quantity of 
which is subsumed in the direct utility function u. Then  ) 0 ( ) , ( <
n y y τ  can then be thought of the 
charge levied on those who draw the income y in a community with mean income
n y .         
The implied demand functions are  ] , ), , ( [ 2 p X y y y X
n n
i τ +  (i=1,2) and the corresponding 
demand functions for the neighbors are  ] , ), , ( [ 2 p X y y y X
n n
i τ − .  We assume that these functions 
are non-decreasing in incomes, implying marginal propensities to spend that are non-negative 
and bounded above by unity for both goods and both groups. The indirect utility function is: 
                                                 
13   The property can be relaxed to allow post-transfer income inequality with full risk sharing by 
introducing a risk-free idiosyncratic income component. 
14   Coate and Ravallion derive a function of the form  ) , (
n y y τ  as the solution to a repeated 
noncooperative game in which each player faces an independent and uncertain income stream with 
) , (
n y y  as the possible draws in a given state of nature.  They characterize the solution for the case in 
which utility depends on own income, and compare this to the optimal insurance scheme. Extending their 
analysis to the present situation of externalities would not appear to be difficult (the simplest approach 
would assume that utility is separable between own income and neighbor’s income.)   9
  )] , ( ) , ( max[ ] , ), , ( [ ~ ) , ( 2 1 2 2 1 2
n n n n n y y y pX X X X X u p X y y y v y y v τ τ + = + − = + ≡  (2) 
(The corresponding utility function for the neighbors is  ) , ( y y v
n .)  Applying the envelope theorem 











































     (3) 
This captures the two opposing effects: the positive return to neighbors becoming better off and 
hence more generous ( 0 / > ∂ ∂
n y τ ) versus enhanced relative deprivation ( 0 / 2 > ∂ ∂
n n Y X ).   
Three special cases are instructive about the range of possible outcomes.   
Case 1: Full risk-sharing.  It is plain from (3) that the positive effect will always dominate 
the RD effect under full risk sharing. Then  0 / > ∂ ∂
n y v , given that 1 / = ∂ ∂
n y τ  and 
0 / 2 ≥ ∂ ∂
n n Y X p  ( 1 / 2 − > ∂ ∂
n n Y X p  is all that is strictly required).   With full risk sharing, RD 
cannot be the dominant social effect in this model at any income level.  
Case 2: Partial risk-sharing with small transfers:  With partial risk-sharing, the 
equilibrium transfer is the maximum that can be sustained without inducing the donor’s 
defection, i.e.,  ) , (
n y y τ  is defined implicitly by equating the donor’s benefit from defection with 
the utility-cost of defecting, c:
15 
   c y y y y v y y v
n n n = − − ] ), , ( [ ) , ( τ   (for  ) y y
n > )     (4) 
We can treat c as exogenously fixed, implying that: 
  n n
n n
n y y y v
y y y v
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        ( 5 )  
                                                 
15   Note that  ) , ( y y v
n  is the neighbor’s utility and recall that  0 ) , ( ) , ( = + y y y y
n n τ τ .   10
It is clear from (5) that for small transfers, the maximum possible τ  without inducing defection 
is unresponsive to changes in
n y .  Setting  0 / = ∂ ∂
n y τ  in (3) it is evident that when efficient risk-
sharing is not feasible and transfers are small, RD will dominate ( 0 / < ∂ ∂
n y v ).   
Between these extremes, stronger assumptions are needed to determine the direction of 
the welfare effect with large transfers that fall short of full risk sharing.  Nor can it be presumed 
that the external effect will have the same sign whatever the level of own-income.  This is 
illustrated by the following case.  
Case 3: Partial risk sharing, non-negligible transfers and an interaction effect.  In this 
special case, the positive externality dominates for the poor, but this switches at sufficiently high 
incomes, when RD becomes the dominant social effect.  To see how this can happen, notice first 
that (from equation 3), there are two ways that differences in own-income y could affect the 
balance between the two opposing external effects.  The first is through an interaction effect 
between own income and neighbors’ income in the transfer function and the second is through 
any own-income effect on neighbors’ marginal propensity to consume the positional good.  Let 
us close off the first effect by assuming that the utility function is separable between y and
n y , so 
that the marginal propensity to transfer, 0 / 1 > ∂ ∂ >
n y τ , does not depend on y.  The first term on 
the RHS of (3) is thus a constant.   
Focusing on the second term in (3), Case 3 assumes that the marginal propensity to 
consume the positional good is very low at low incomes.  Our idea here is that when both 
incomes are very low, social rivalries are likely to be dominated by the attainment of basic needs 
for survival.
16  So we set 
n n Y X p ∂ ∂ / 2  sufficiently close to zero at 
min y  such that  0 / > ∂ ∂
n y v .  At 
                                                 
16   We do not need a kink in the demand functions, which can still be continuous with continuous 
first derivatives.  All we require is that the income gradient is sufficiently low at low incomes.    11
higher incomes, the social aspect of the positional good starts to influence budget allocations; in 
particular, we assume that the neighbor’s marginal propensity to spend on the positional good 
rises to near unity at 
max y  (the boundary condition can be relaxed without changing the result).  
Then  0 / < ∂ ∂
n y v  at 
max y y = .  By continuity there will be a unique switch point in the income 
space, below which  0 / > ∂ ∂
n y v  and above which  0 / < ∂ ∂
n y v .  We will look for such an 
interaction effect in our data. 
       
3.  Issues in testing for relative deprivation 
Past econometric tests for welfare effects of relative deprivation have regressed self-rated 
welfare (satisfaction with life or happiness) on both own income and an estimate of comparison 
group income, namely the mean income of people living in the same area or working in the same 
industry or with similar characteristics (age, education, occupation).
17  Almost all studies using 
this method have found a negative welfare effect of comparison-group income.
18  This section 
identifies a number of problems with this approach, some of which suggest that it will be biased 
toward finding signs of RD when it is not in fact present. Our alternative test using subjective 
economic welfare avoids these concerns, though it introduces some potential new sources of 
bias, which we also discuss.  
Identifying the comparison group and measuring its welfare   
One concern with the standard approach in the literature is that the researcher must make 
an a priori judgment about the relevant comparison group.  Yet this can vary greatly from person 
                                                 
17   Examples of the various approaches can be found in Stadt et al. (1985), Clark and Oswald (1996), 
Pradhan and Ravallion (2000), Ravallion and Lokshin (2002), McBride (2001), Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2004), Senik (2004), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) and Luttmer (2005).   
18   An exception is Senik (2004) who finds a positive effect, which she attributes to the fact that her 
data are for a transition economy, namely Russia   12
to person.  It has been argued that “.. comparisons are most salient if individuals perceive the 
reference person or group as in some way similar to themselves” (Kahneman and Varey, 1991, p. 
140; also see Runciman, 1966).  But that is based on the individual’s own judgment, given 
idiosyncratic informational and social factors that a researcher would have a very hard time 
observing in any systematic way.  Neither psychological nor economic theories of RD offer 
much insight into who constitutes the relevant comparison group. The researcher must make 
some potentially strong identifying assumptions.   
A further concern is that differences in the objective economic welfare of one’s neighbors 
can hardly be relevant to RD, or the security that may come from knowing that friends and 
neighbors are capable of coming to one’s aid, unless those differences are known and perceived 
as relevant.  The objective circumstances will undoubtedly matter to some channels by which the 
external effect is transmitted, such as capacity to pay for local public goods.  However, in 
accounting for differences in overall well-being, it can be argued that the subjective assessment 
is likely to matter more than the objective one.  The objective measure can be thought of as a 
poorly measured proxy for the true perception of the comparison group’s welfare.  Assuming  
classical measurement errors, attenuation biases can be expected, although the errors could also 
be correlated with the dependent variable in this case, clouding the direction of bias.  
Nor has the literature tested for interaction effects.  If the external effect switches sign as 
income rises (as suggested by Case 3 in section 2) then not allowing for this interaction effect 
could suggest little or no relationship, by averaging across the positive and negative effects.   
A potentially important source of interaction effects in a developing country is 
urbanization.  It can be conjectured that community-based risk sharing and collective action   
erodes with urbanization; the repeated interaction amongst essentially the same group of people   13
that sustains informal risk-sharing arrangements may well be more common in village-based 
societies than urban areas with more mobile populations.
19  Comparing how our tests for relative 
deprivation differ between urban and rural areas also offers a clue as to how the importance of 
relative poverty might change over time, as the economy becomes more urbanized. 
In the light of the above observations, we take two approaches to testing.  In both cases, 
our dependent variable is provided by the answers to a ‘satisfaction with life’ (SWL) question. 
(The question does not refer to any specific aspect of ‘satisfaction with life’.  We give the precise 
question used in section 3.2.) This has probably been the most widely used question for assessing 
overall well-being in psychology and economics.
20  We shall do one test for RD that is similar to 
the methods used in past research, except that we allow for interaction effects.  This method uses 
a standard objective measure of economic welfare based on consumption, including that of the 
geographic area in which the respondent lives.  However, our data and methods allow us to take 
a different approach that avoids the need to pre-judge the comparison group and the precise 
welfare metric.  For this purpose, questions were added to the Malawi survey on the respondent’s 
assessments of the economic welfare of the family’s ‘friends’ and ‘neighbors.’  This has the 
advantage that it is tailor-made to the perceptions of the respondent.  However, as we also 
discuss below, that advantage comes with the drawback that there may be latent variables that 
jointly influence both the respondent’s overall satisfaction with life and how she perceives the 
welfare of friends and neighbors.  
While friends and neighbors are obvious groups for both social comparisons and as 
generators of positive externalities such as through risk-sharing, there may be other groups that 
matter.  Finding that people do not feel RD with respect to their friends and neighbors does not 
                                                 
19   For supportive evidence see Ravallion and Dearden (1988) (using data for Java, Indonesia). 
20   Surveys of the lessons for economics from the “new psychology of happiness” can be found in 
Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Layard (2005).    14
(of course) preclude RD with respect to some other comparison group.  Could the presence of 
latent social comparators bias our inferences about friends and neighbors?  Our estimates are 
only unbiased if the economic welfare of the omitted group is uncorrelated with that of friends 
and neighbors.  Perceived deprivation compared to some omitted group will lead us to 
underestimate (overestimate) the welfare gains from having better-off friends and neighbors if 
the economic welfare of the omitted group is positively (negatively) correlated with the included 
groups.  It seems unlikely that people with poor (rich) friends and neighbors would tend to 
compare themselves with rich (poor) omitted groups.  If we discount that possibility, then we can 
still be confident that friends and neighbors are not a source of relative deprivation when we find 
a positive external effect.      
The frame-of-reference effect  
A potentially important but neglected concern about past empirical studies of self-
assessed welfare is that different people may attach different meanings to the categories used in 
satisfaction or happiness questions.
21  People answer such questions relative to their personal 
frame of reference (FOR), which depends on their own knowledge and experience.  And this is 
likely to be correlated with characteristics of where they live, including mean income.  It would 
seems reasonable to assume that people living in poor areas tend to have more limited 
knowledge and experience of the full range of levels of living found in the society as a whole.  
Someone living in a poor village who has only infrequently left the village and gone no further 
than the county town, will undoubtedly rate her economic welfare higher than someone with the 
same real income living in a city, who sees far greater affluence around her.     
                                                 
21   This is an instance of what is called differential item functioning (DIF) in the literature on 
educational testing where DIF exists if students with equal latent ability have different probabilities of 
giving a correct answer; for an overview of the history and methods of addressing DIF see Angoff (993).       15
In these circumstances, heterogeneity in frames of reference will translate into 
corresponding differences in satisfaction with life.  At given objective circumstances, the person 
living in the poor area will have higher perceived welfare because she simply does not know that 
many people live better than she does.  Thus the regressions used in this literature would tend to 
reveal a negative coefficient on neighbors’ mean income, even if there is no direct social 
comparison effect on utility, as postulated by RD theory.  All the negative regression coefficient 
reflects is the difference in knowledge, which creates a systematic difference in the scale used to 
assess well-being. While the FOR effect would appear to be a serious concern about past tests for 
RD, we can find no discussion in the literature of the likely biases.
22   
By using the respondent’s self-assessed economic welfare instead of the objective value, 
y, for explaining SWL we can reduce the bias, under the assumption that all subjective measures 
for a given respondent are subject to the same FOR effect.  This is plausible since they are 
constrained by the same knowledge and experience.  To see how this works, suppose that 
satisfaction with life would be  * SWL   if everyone had the same FOR, and (for the sake of the 
argument) let us assume that there is no RD effect, so that  ε β α + + = y SWL*  with  0 > β  (and 
innovation error term ε ).  However, we do not observe  * SWL  but rather  η + = * SWL SWL  
where η  is the FOR effect, which is negatively correlated with
n y  (for the reasons given above); 
in particular, assume that 
n y π η = ,  0 < π . Then
n y  will have a negative coefficient in the test 
equation for RD,  ε π β α + + + =
n y y SWL , even when there is no RD.  Now include a subjective 
indicator of y, namely own-economic welfare (OEW), which is subject to the same FOR effect, 
                                                 
22   Luttmer (2005) notes that the definition of ‘happiness’ might shift according to location but does 
not analyze the likely direction of bias, given that (as we argue here) the mean income of neighbors is 
likely to be correlated with knowledge about the range of objective levels of living in society as a whole.     16
i.e., ν η γ + + = y OEW  with an innovation error termν .  The restriction that  β γ ≥  seems 
plausible; if anything the income effect would be lower for SWL.  The test equation becomes:  






α + − + + =
n y OEW SWL       (7)           
(where  γ βν ε ε / * − = ).  Thus the bias arising from heterogeneous FOR effects is attenuated 
using subjective economic welfare as the regressor, and it is eliminated entirely when the income 
effect for SWL is the same as for OEW ( γ β = ). 
Endogeneity of comparison-group welfare 
In common with other tests of RD theories in the literature, we treat our measures of the 
economic welfare of friends and neighbors as exogenous.
23  This is unlikely to be as strong an 
assumption in this setting as in developed countries.  Poor people in developing countries clearly 
do not have the same degree of freedom to choose their location — and hence their neighbors — 
as in a developing country.  In rural areas, poor people have typically lived in the same village or 
nearby for most of their lives.  (We look at some evidence on this point for Malawi later.)  It can 
also be argued that the externalities at issue stem from pre-existing relationships, which facilitate 
repeated interaction and trust.  Exogeneity is a plausible assumption for risk sharing; people are 
unlikely to enter an informal risk-sharing arrangement with strangers.
24  That is more contentious 
for the social comparisons than generate relative deprivation.  If RD is an important factor then it 
may prompt people to change their friends and neighbors.    
If poor people were free to choose their friends and neighbors, what would we expect to 
find in our data?  With sufficient continuity, we can think of their problem as that of choosing 
                                                 
23   It is difficult to imagine defensible instrumental variables in this case; any variable that would 
influence one’s choice of friends and neighbors would presumably also be a direct influence on one’s 
overall welfare, invalidating the exclusion restriction required for identification. 
24   There is evidence on this point in Fafchamps and Gubert (2005) who studied risk-sharing 
relationships amongst rural Filipinos.   17
the comparison group’s level of economic welfare.  (This simplification is possible since, in our 
model, the only relevant parameter about a comparison group is its economic welfare.)  Under 
regular conditions (sufficient to assure an interior optimum) the solution will entail setting to 
zero the derivative of the indirect utility function (as in equation 3) with respect to the 
comparison group's welfare.  If (as we assume) satisfaction with life is a valid indicator of utility 
then we would not expect to find any partial correlation between SWL and our measures of the 
economic welfare of the comparison groups, controlling for the other covariates (including Y).  
As we will see, this is not what we find in our data.   
That is not a conclusive basis for dismissing concerns about endogenous choice of 
comparison-group welfare.  We may still observe a correlation in the data because of the 
existence of unobserved variables that jointly influence both SWL and the choice of friends and 
neighbors.  To explore the implications for our tests, we can (without loss of generality) take it to 
be the case that the unobserved variable raises utility.  If that variable raises (lowers) the 
marginal utility of comparison-group welfare then it will increase (decrease) the optimal
n y , i.e., 
the latent variable will tend to be positively (negatively) correlated with
n y , implying that we 
over-estimate (under-estimate) the coefficient in a regression of SWL on
n y .   
What direction of bias can we expect?  Let us assume that equilibrium transfers attenuate 
(or at least do no accentuate) welfare disparities, i.e., friends and neighbors tend to be more (less) 
generous to people who have lower (higher) utility ceteris paribus.  It can also be presumed that 
people in a risk-sharing group are better informed about each other’s true welfare than is the 
researcher — in particular that they observe the latent factor in the model.  Under these 
conditions, a latent utility-increasing factor will tend to reduce the marginal utility of
n y , and 
hence the optimal
n y , since friends and neighbors will be less generous in their transfers to those   18
who are better endowed with that factor.  Hence,
n y  will tend to be negatively correlated with the 
latent variable in our tests, and we will under-estimate the regression coefficient on
n y  when we 
treat it as exogenous.   
This provides a further reason to suspect that past tests for RD in the literature are biased 
toward finding signs of RD — a negative effect of higher comparison-group economic welfare 
on measures of own-utility — in settings in which people are relatively free to choose their 
comparison group but there are also private transfers.  In effect, the higher measured economic 
welfare of the comparison group is picking up a negative utility factor (unobserved to the 
researcher) that enhances the benefits from having a better-off comparison group, who can help 
compensate for the negative utility factor.  In many developed-country settings where there is 
considerable geographic mobility, such as the US, this would seem a serious concern.  Note that 
if we find that higher
n y  has a positive welfare effect when treating
n y  as exogenous then 
allowing for endogenous choice of
n y  would actually strengthen our conclusion that, on balance, 
people tend to gain from higher
n y , i.e., that RD is not the dominant social effect on welfare. 
Reporting biases in subjective data 
Another concern about our tests relates to our reliance on subjective assessments of 
welfare (whether the respondent’s own welfare or that of friends and neighbors).  These 
measures may not reflect well the true circumstances of either the respondent or her friends and 
neighbors.  This is not a valid concern given that it is the subjective assessments that are of 
intrinsic interest in this context.  Having better-off friends and neighbors is only going to matter 
to perceived well-being if one in fact perceives that the friends and neighbors are better off.     
This argument assumes that people report accurately to the interviewer on their 
perceptions of both their own welfare and that of their friends and neighbors.  More worrying for   19
our tests is the possibility of systematic (non-random) reporting biases.  If RD is a source of 
disutility then it may well influence the answers given to interviewers.  Could this undermine our 
tests?  It is instructive to consider a simple, yet seemingly plausible, model of that bias.  Suppose 
that utility depends on own-economic welfare and comparison-group welfare and that RD 
matters, but to ‘save face’ the respondent hides the true RD from the interview.  More precisely, 
assume that the responses are biased in amounts that are directly proportional to the difference 
between (true) own welfare and that of the comparison group; if the respondent feels poorer than 
her comparison group then she over-states her own economic welfare and/or under-states that of 
her comparison group.  Evidently then the true parameters are positively-weighted linear 
combinations of the estimated parameters based on the reported data.
25  The key implication is 
that (even though we do not know the bias parameters) if we find that both own-welfare and 
comparison-group welfare have positive coefficients then this must also be the case for the true 
parameters; reporting biases cannot be hiding a true RD effect when no such effect is observed 
empirically.      
 
4.  Data and methods for Malawi 
We use the 2004 round of the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (MIHS).  This is a 
comprehensive, nationally-representative survey of households administered between March 
2004 and April 2005 by the Government of Malawi’s National Statistical Office with assistance 
from the World Bank, under the Living Standards Measurement Study.  A two-stage stratified 
sample is based on the 1998 Malawi Population Census and is drawn from 564 enumerating 
                                                 
25   Suppose that  ε β α + + =
n y y u  for a measure of own-economic welfare y and comparison-group 
welfare 
n y .  The reported values are related to the true values according to:  ) ( ˆ 1
n y y y y − − = ϕ  and 
) ( ˆ 2
n n n y y y y − + = ϕ  where  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i ϕ  (i=1,2). Then  2 1) 1 ( ϕ ϕ α b a + − =  and  1 2) 1 ( ϕ ϕ β a b + − = .     20
areas (EA).
26  In the first stage, the EAs were selected from each of the 30 strata (formed by 
districts split into urban and rural) with probability proportional to size.  In the second stage, 20 
households were randomly selected from each EA, giving a total sample of 11,280 households. 
MIHS collects data on household consumptions of a wide range of food and non-food 
items, detailed information about the socio-demographic composition of the interviewed 
households, labor status of the household members, health, educational achievements, various 
sources of household income including income in-kind, and individual wages. A section of the 
questionnaire asks the opinion of the household head about the household’s standard of living, 
including questions about satisfaction with life and the economic ladder questions, which were 
added to the survey for the purpose of this study.       
Our measure of overall welfare is provided by answers to the satisfaction with life (SWL) 
question: “Overall, how satisfied (content, happy) are you with your life?  Are you (1) very 
unsatisfied; (2) unsatisfied; (3) neither unsatisfied nor satisfied; (4) satisfied; (5) very satisfied?” 
This was asked of the household head, but with explicit reference to the household’s standard of 
living. The majority of the sample were not satisfied; 62.53% answered either (1) or (2) (24.35% 
gave (1)).  Slightly less than one quarter were satisfied; 18.33% gave (4) as their answer and 
5.57% gave (5).  (The remainder, 13.57%, reported that they were neither unsatisfied nor 
satisfied.)  These numbers indicate a much lower level of satisfaction with life than found in 
Western Europe where 80-90% of the population report that they are satisfied with their lives 
when asked the same question in surveys, as compared to one quarter in Malawi (Delhey, 2004).  
While SWL is the natural choice for identifying a measure of utility, how should we 
measure economic welfare (Y), as one argument of utility?  We will use alternative objective and 
subjective measures.  The most widely-used objective measure of economic welfare in 
                                                 
26   For a more detailed description of the sample design see National Statistics Office (2005).    21
developing countries is consumption expenditure per person (C) given by the total household 
expenditure, including spending on food (purchased and home-produced and food received as 
gifts), non-food items, estimated flow of services from consumer durable goods and actual or 
self-estimated rental cost of housing.
27 Although this is a comprehensive consumption aggregate, 
there are well-known concerns about how well it reflects welfare, even when thought of as the 
narrower concept of ‘economic welfare.’
28   
A strict interpretation of our theoretical model would imply that  C y y y Y
n = + = ) , ( τ .  
However, our theoretical model simplifies reality in a number of respects, leaving concerns 
about how well consumption reflects perceptions of own economic status.  The literature has 
pointed to concerns about (inter alia) the use of a market-price weighted aggregate of 
consumption and the calibration of deflators for demographic differences and cost-of-living 
differences.  In that light, we cannot rule out the possibility that our results using consumption as 
the measure of Y will be biased by correlations between the perceived economic welfare of 
friends and neighbors and the errors in measuring own welfare using consumption. 
For these reasons, we also consider a measure of self-assessed economic welfare based 
on the own-economic welfare (OEW) question in which respondents are asked: “Imagine six 
steps, where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the 
sixth, stand the rich (show a picture of the steps).  On which step are you today?” 
We also need measures of the economic welfare of relevant groups for social comparison 
or risk-sharing. People in geographic proximity to the respondent are an obvious source of 
comparators, co-insurers and help in other ways, such as finding employment.  Using the 
                                                 
27   For details on how the consumption aggregate was formed see World Bank (2005b). 
28   On the identification problem in consumer demand-based measures see Pollak (1991). Slesnick 
(1998) surveys alternative empirical approaches. Subjective welfare measures have been seen as a 
promising route to avoiding the identification problems in deriving a metric of welfare from observed 
demand behavior; for overviews of this approach see van Praag (1991) and Kapteyn (1994).   22
geographic structure of the sample design we can estimate mean consumption of ‘neighbors’ 
using the survey data for the primary sampling unit containing each sampled household.  The 
mean consumption of neighbors is estimated by the leave-out mean for the EA for each sampled 
household, i.e., the mean consumption of all sampled households in the respondent’s EA, 
excluding the respondent.      
As noted above, it is not clear that this provides a good measure of the economic welfare 
of neighbors.  However, there is an additional source of information for studying social effects 
(that appears to have been largely ignored in the literature), namely to ask survey respondents 
about their comparison groups.  We also use questions asking people about how they perceive 
the economic welfare of the two most obvious comparison groups: friends and neighbors.  
(Workplace comparisons are another possibility, but these are of limited relevance in a poor, 
largely rural, country such as Malawi.) It is left to the respondent to judge who are their friends 
and neighbors, and by what standard their economic status is to be judged.   With regard to the 
respondent’s friends we use the friends’ economic welfare (FEW) question: “Imagine six steps, 
where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the sixth, 
stand the rich: (show a picture of the steps).  On which step are most of your friends today?”  
The same question is asked about neighbors’ economic welfare (NEW). 
Notice that consumption is measured post transfers and that it is reasonable to presume 
that OEW also reflects post-transfer economic welfare. Thus, a strict interpretation of our model 
in section 2 would suggest that any effects on SWL of either mean consumption in the locality or 
of FEW or NEW, controlling for our measures of own-economic welfare, could only reflect RD 
(since the transfer effect operates through own-economic welfare).  That provides a seemingly   23
strong test of RD theory: if the theory is right then we should find a negative conditional effect 
on SWL of our measure of the economic welfare of friends and neighbors.   
However, this identifying assumption puts too much onus on our particular theoretical 
model.  We can reasonably expect that the longer-term security provided by friends and 
neighbors would enhance one’s satisfaction with life independently of current economic welfare.  
(That would also be the case if wealth gains to friends and neighbors facilitate investments in 
local public goods that take time to increase economic welfare.)  So RD effects may still be 
present even if we find a non-negative effect of comparison-group welfare controlling for own-
economic welfare; the more robust conclusion one can draw is that RD may exist but is not 
dominant over the positive external effect. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics (including for the control variables we will use in 
our regressions later); we also give an urban-rural breakdown.  Note that on average, people tend 
to think that they are worse off economically than their friends and neighbors.  Also note that in 
all dimensions (objective and subjective) living standards are higher in urban areas. 
Two potentially important sources of positive external effects for poor people from 
better-off households are private transfers and employment, in the form of ganyu (as noted in the 
Introduction).  Figure 1 shows how the total value of gifts given and gifts received (in cash and 
with imputed values for in-kind) vary with log consumption per person.  (These are locally-
smoothed scatter plots.)  Gifts given (as a proportion of consumption) tend to rise with 
consumption, though with a sign of a U-shaped relationship in rural areas. Gifts received tend to 
fall in rural areas, but with signs of a u-shaped relationship in rural areas.  Note that recorded 
receipts greatly exceed the value of gifts given (Table 1); this appears to be common in survey   24
data.  The net value of gifts received less gifts given represents about 5% of total consumption 
expenditure for the poorest households, and the ratio tends to fall with log consumption.   
Recall that supplying casual piecework labor is known to be an important coping 
mechanism for the poor in Malawi. Figure 2 gives both the days of ganyu (over the last year) and 
income from ganyu as a proportion of total consumption expenditure, plotted against log 
consumption per person.  It is clear that ganyu is a very important source of income for the 
poorest in both rural and urban areas; the poorest do about 80 days of ganyu per year, which 
accounts for a third or more of their consumption.  The share of consumption accountable to 
ganyu falls sharply as living standards rise.  
Another descriptive graph of interest is in Figure 3, which gives nonparametric 
regressions of the length of residence on log consumption per person.  We see that there are 
markedly less signs of geographic mobility for the poor, in both urban and rural areas.  The 
poorest households have lived in the same place for 15-20 years on average, while the least poor 
have done so for about 7 years.  This does not suggest that people have been very active in 
choosing their neighbors by moving, though of course they may well be far more active in 
choosing their friends.  
The two tests we perform on these data differ according to whether they use objective or 
subjective measures of economic welfare.  Test 1 entails regressing SWL on lnC, the log of the 
leave-out mean consumption for the enumeration area (denoted
n C ) and a vector of controls (X), 
which attempt to also deal with systematic differences in the scales used for assessing welfare.  
(Table 1 lists the control variables.)  This is similar to other tests found in the literature (cited 
above), except that we allow for an interaction effect between own consumption and neighbors’   25
consumption.  In specifying the econometric model, reported SWL is interpreted as a qualitative 
indicator of continuous latent utility: 




i i i X C C C C u ε π γ β α + + + + = ln . ln ln ln      (8) 
Assuming that the innovation error term  i ε  is normally distributed we use an Ordered Probit 
(OP) to estimate the parameters of (8).         
Test 2 exploits the self-assessments of the economic welfare of friends and neighbors.  
This entails studying how SWL varies jointly with OEW, NEW and FEW.   Initially we do not 
impose any parametric structure on the relationship.  We then introduce the vector of regression 
controls, X, to allow for observable heterogeneity in household and geographic factors that might 
by biasing our tests.  For this purpose, we switch to a parametric specification, again using an 
OP.  The unobserved measure of utility now takes the form: 
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    (9) 
We also test an extended version of (9) in which the parameters on friend’s and neighbor’s 
economic welfare differ according to whether they are seen to be better or worse off than the 
household in question.  This entails adding to (9),  i i i FEW FEW OEW I ) ( < and 
i i i i FEW OEW FEW OEW I ) ( < (and similarly for NEW) where I is a dummy variable taking the 
value one if  i i FEW OEW < and zero otherwise.   
 
5. Results 
  Our results for Test 1, based on equation (8) are found in Table 2.  We give two sets of 
results, depending on how we deal with geographic effects.  In column (1) we use regional and 
urban-rural dummy variables, while in column (2) we use a complete set of dummy variables for   26
the 221 ‘traditional authorities’ (TA) (clusters of contiguous villages or urban localities); this is 
the maximum disaggregation we can have in allowing for geographic effects without losing 
identification.   
Consistently with Case 3 in section 2, we find a negative interaction effect ( 0 ˆ < γ ).  The 
effect is only significantly different from zero at the 10% level in specification (1), but becomes 
(highly) significant in specification  (2).   
The results of Test 1 indicate a positive effect of neighbors’ consumption for the bulk of 
the data, though this declines as own-consumption rises.  Using the more precise estimates from 
specification (2) in Table 2, we find that the neighborhood consumption effect is positive for 
79% of data points (all those with log consumption under 10.21).  However, SWL increases with 
own consumption over the entire range of consumptions found in the data.   
There are a number of significant effects amongst the controls, though many of the 
parameter estimates are sensitive to allowing for a more complete accounting of the geographic 
effects, by including the TA dummy variables (which are clearly highly correlated with the other 
variables).   Female headed households have lower SWL, agricultural households have higher 
SWL, although in specification (1) this effect is almost exactly offset by a negative effect of 
being a rural household.  Many of the TA dummy variables had significant coefficients in (2). 
On splitting the sample between rural and urban areas we find marked differences, as can 
be seen in Table 3.  (We do not report the coefficients on X to save space.) The external effect of 
neighbors’ consumption and its negative interaction effect with own-consumption remain strong 
in rural areas, but they are only evident in urban areas when we include the geographic dummy 
variables (specification 2). In that case we find that the negative external effect dominates; 
indeed, the effect of neighbors’ consumption is negative for the entire urban sample (i.e., log   27
own consumption exceeds 8.04 for all sampled urban households).  By interpretation, RD is the 
weaker social effect in rural areas, but the stronger one in urban areas.    
  Turning to Test 2, Table 4 gives mean SWL for OEW cross-tabbed against FEW and 
NEW; the lower panel is the cross-tab of friends’ rank against neighbors’ rank.  We see that mean 
satisfaction with life rises with self-assessed economic welfare. And amongst those who consider 
themselves to be on either of the lowest two rungs of the economic welfare ladder, SWL rises 
with the perceived economic welfare of both friends and neighbors.  For the (self-assessed) poor, 
these results are clearly more consistent with the theories that predict positive externalities — 
echoing our previous results using objective measures of economic welfare.  However, the 
gradient in mean SWL is markedly attenuated as one goes up the own-economic welfare ladder, 
with signs of a negative gradient with respect to neighbor’s economic welfare emerging at the 
upper rungs.  Relative deprivation appears to emerge at higher levels of own-economic welfare. 
We also see that amongst those who feel that they have poor neighbors, having well-off friends 
results in higher mean SWL.  This gradient is more robust as one moves up the NEW ladder. 
  An alternative non-parametric representation of the relationships in the data is found in 
Figure 4, which shows how the relationship between SWL and lnC is shifted by changes in NEW 
and FEW.  The upper panel gives nonparametric regressions (again we use a locally-smoothed 
scatter plot) of SWL on log consumption per capita (lnC) split according to friends’ perceived 
economic welfare (FEW); the lower panel gives the corresponding regression functions for NEW 
and also provides the frequency distribution of lnC.  It can be seen that, over the bulk of the data, 
higher FEW or NEW tends to come with higher SWL at given lnC.  In both cases, the differences 
tend to be smaller amongst the consumption-poor.  Looking at these figures, it is hard to find 
much support for the implications of RD theory.     28
  While these results are suggestive, there remains the question of whether they are robust 
to adding controls for observable heterogeneity.  To do this we now switch to a simplified 
parametric representation of Test 2.  The key simplification is that we make the linearity 
assumption that the impact of a change from one rung to the next is constant. This assumption is 
clearly a simplification (for example, we see in Table 2 a larger change in mean SWL as one 
moves from rungs 1 to 2 than 3 to 4).   
Table 5 provides our estimates of equation (9).  (We dropped the term in FEW.NEW as it 
was highly insignificant.)   Table 6 gives the derivatives and their standard errors; we give the 
derivatives w.r.t. OEW evaluated at FEW=NEW.  We find a negative interaction effect for both 
NEW and FEW, though it is only statistically significant for FEW.  The estimates imply that 
higher OEW yields higher SWL for all levels of FEW and NEW.  For specification (1), the impact 
on SWL of higher FEW is positive for the lowest two rungs of OEW (though only significant for 
the lowest rung) while for NEW the effect is positive for the lowest four rungs (and significantly 
so for the lowest three).  For (2), a significant negative effect emerges for FEW in the upper three 
rungs of OEW; however, there is no significant effect of NEW in either direction at all levels of 
OEW.   These results suggest that RD does emerge as a concern amongst middle and relatively 
well-off groups, at least for friends.  However, we cannot rule out the possibility that this stems 
from a downward bias in our regression coefficient on the economic welfare of friends and 
neighbors when own-economic welfare reaches a relatively high level.  This would be the case if 
people only become effectively free to choose their friends and neighbors at sufficiently high 
economic welfare, and if there are sources of utility that are unobserved by the researcher but 
observed by the people concerned, and voluntary redistribution tends to attenuate disparities in 
utility, as discussed in section 3.1.   29
The rural-urban split of the main coefficients for Test 2 can be found in Table 7.  Now we 
find no sign of an external effect (in either direction) in urban areas, though the effects found in 
Table 5 remain strong in rural areas.  
We also checked if there are greater effects of FEW and NEW when a person felt worse 
off than her neighbors and friends, by adding the four interaction effects with the dummy 
variables described in the previous section.  In specification (1), three of the four extra 
interaction effects had coefficients that were not significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level; the fourth, i i i i OEW NEW NEW OEW I ) ( < , had a coefficient of 0.037 with a standard error 
of 0.016.  In specification (2) none of the four interaction effects were significant at the 10% 
level.  While there is some sign of a less strong negative interaction effect between OEW and 
NEW for those who feel poorer than their neighbors, the more parsimonious specification in (9) 
appears to provide an adequate representation of the data.   
To help interpret our results, it is of interest to examine the contours of equation (9), as 
obtained by calculating the critical value of OEW needed to compensate for differences in FEW 
and NEW, while holding the expected value of utility constant (i.e., at 0 = ε ).  This can be 
interpreted as the utility-consistent poverty line in the space of economic welfare corresponding 
to a fixed reference utility level (the poverty line in the space of utility).  When RD is the 
dominant social effect, the utility consistent poverty line will rise with comparison group 
economic welfare.  However, this switches when the positive externality is dominant. Fixing the 
expected value of utility at
* u  one solves (9) for:
29 
                                                 
29   We set  0 = δ  consistently with our empirical results.  Note that 
* OEW is a continuous variable, 
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Table 8 provides the values of 
* OEW  at mean points for X and for two reference utility levels 
defined by the middle two cut-off points from the OP from Table 4, specification (1).  The 
proportion of the population reporting that they are below the lower of these two cut-off points 
(i.e., that they are either ‘very unsatisfied’ or ‘unsatisfied’) corresponds closely to prevailing 
estimates of the poverty rate for Malawi. 
  Focusing first on panel (a) in Table 8, we find that for 
* u  at the estimated cut-off point 
below which one is either ‘very unsatisfied’ or ‘unsatisfied,’ the value of 
* OEW  tends to fall as 
FEW rises (at given NEW) and similarly 
* OEW  falls as NEW rises (at given FEW).  This pattern 
reflects the positive utility gains from having better off friends and neighbors.  However, the 
pattern reverses when we shift to the higher reference utility level (panel b), when the RD effect 
kicks in.  Then the poverty lines in the space of perceived economic welfare start to look like 
relative poverty lines.  However, note that in all cases in Table 8, the gradients in 
* OEW  are 
small; to the nearest ladder rung, the poverty line is at  3
* = OEW  for 80% of cases in panel (a) 
and it is  4
* = OEW  for 80% of cases in panel (b). 
 
6. Conclusions 
  Relative deprivation is seen to stem from social comparisons that generate negative 
externalities from economic gains to friends and neighbors. Other theories point instead to 
positive external effects arising from institutions for risk-sharing, the provision of local-public 
goods, local employment opportunities or productivity-enhancing spillovers.  These arguments 
predict that it is an asset to have well-off friends and neighbors.       31
We have identified conditions under which relative deprivation will dominate the gains 
from risk sharing or collective provisioning.  If full risk-sharing is attainable then the positive 
effect of an increase in the community’s mean income will always dominate relative deprivation. 
With partial risk sharing (constrained by the need to avoid defection from the co-insurance 
group) the outcome is less clear.  In a special case of our general model, we show that the 
positive external effect will tend to be the dominant factor for the poor, while relative deprivation 
will emerge as a concern at high incomes.   
In marked contrast to past empirical work for developed countries, our empirical results 
do not suggest that perceived economic disparities relative to friends and neighbors are a 
welfare-relevant concern for most people in Malawi, and certainly not for the poor.  Neither 
objective nor subjective measures of economic welfare reveal any sign of relative deprivation 
effects for poor people.  Indeed, most specifications tested indicate significant positive external 
effects for the bulk of the data, though these effects are largely confined to rural areas.  We 
cannot rule out biases in our tests arising from systematic reporting errors and endogenous 
choice of friends and neighbors, though we have pointed to seemingly plausible assumptions 
under which correcting for these biases would not alter our main qualitative conclusion that 
having well-off friends and neighbors in this setting is generally seen as an asset not a liability.  
We find signs of a negative interaction effect between friends’ economic welfare and own own-
economic welfare in rural areas, such that relative deprivation does emerge as a concern amongst 
the relatively well-off.  Within the boundaries of this low-income country, we find economically 
well-off people who essentially care about relative position, side-by-side with a large number of 
poorer people (by far the majority) who appears to care far more about their absolute levels of 
living.   32
These findings offer a welfarist explanation as to why absolute poverty considerations 
have dominated development-policy discussions.  We find little support for the idea implied by 
relative deprivation theory of a poverty line which rises with the mean income of the comparison 
group.  Indeed, our results suggest the opposite property; for the bulk of the households in our 
sample, the utility-consistent poverty line would actually fall as the comparison-group income 
increases (though our quantitative results do not suggest much gradient).  However, on splitting 
our sample between urban and rural areas, our results are consistent with the idea that relative 
deprivation will be more important as the economy becomes more urbanized. 
There are also some potential insights from our results for understanding the causes of 
rural under-development. The dominance of the positive externality for the rural poor implies 
that there will be too little incentive to take actions that increase one’s own income, given the 
spillover effect to others.  In other words, there will be too much poverty from an efficiency 
point of view.  The fact that we find signs that relative deprivation becomes the most important 
social effect amongst the upper economic stratum also suggests the possibility that the incentive 
effect reverses amongst the relatively well-off.  The distributional implications will depend on 
the extent to which economic gains to the rich spillover to benefit the poor.  While we cannot 
rule out the possibility that poor people in Malawi have rich friends and neighbors, it does not 
seem very likely as a general rule, if only because the rich would see the gains from isolating 
themselves physically or socially from the poor.  (Urban enclaves may well be part of that 
process.) If the bulk of the positive external effect from better-off friends and neighbors is 
amongst poor, middle-income and predominantly rural groups, while the relative deprivation 
effect is largely confined amongst urban elites, then we will have a situation in which there will 
also be too much inequality from the point of view of aggregate efficiency.          33
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
  National  Rural Urban 
   Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev. 
Satisfaction with live (SWL)  2.426  1.197  2.348  1.161  2.754  1.287 
Log per capita expenditure   9.794  0.690  9.690  0.621  10.235  0.785 
Log leave-out mean for EA  9.954  0.453  9.839  0.350  10.444  0.506 
Own economic welfare (OEW)  1.754  0.811  1.670  0.764  2.109  0.903 
Friends’ economic welfare (FEW)  2.184  1.064  2.088  1.033  2.588  1.095 
Neighbors’ economic welfare (NEW)  1.929  0.919  1.820  0.857  2.392  1.025 
Transfers and ganyu   
Gifts given as a share of total C  0.013  0.036  0.012  0.034  0.020  0.039 
Gifts received as a share of total C 0.025  0.072  0.024  0.066  0.028  0.093 
Total days of ganyu 33.243  70.514  35.152  70.561  25.182  69.758 
Ganyu earnings as a share of C 0.066  0.881  0.059  0.368  0.097  1.866 
Household demographics   
Household size  4.545  2.335  4.569  2.320  4.442  2.394 
Share of children  0.392  0.002  0.401  0.002  0.352  0.005 
Share of elderly  0.062  0.002  0.069  0.002  0.031  0.003 
Share of adult women  0.275  0.002  0.275  0.002  0.275  0.004 
Share of adult men  0.275  0.002  0.275  0.002  0.275  0.004 
Share of employed  0.603  0.003  0.628  0.003  0.498  0.006 
Female headed household   0.230  0.004  0.241  0.004  0.181  0.008 
Head’s age  42.448  16.357  43.378  16.727  38.520  14.033 
Agricultural household   0.890  0.003  0.966  0.002  0.567  0.011 
Household has an enterprise  0.312  0.004  0.289  0.005  0.410  0.011 
Household has an unemployed person  0.015  0.001  0.004  0.001  0.059  0.005 
Education of the head   
Illiterate  0.269  0.004  0.302  0.005  0.130  0.007 
Junior Primary  0.230  0.004  0.256  0.005  0.122  0.007 
Senior Primary  0.325  0.004  0.323  0.005  0.334  0.010 
Junior Secondary  0.017  0.001  0.016  0.001  0.022  0.003 
Senior Secondary  0.142  0.003  0.095  0.003  0.340  0.010 
University degree  0.016  0.001  0.008  0.001  0.052  0.005 
Regions   
Karonga  0.043  0.002  0.042  0.002  0.047  0.005 
Mzuzu  0.106  0.003  0.103  0.003  0.121  0.007 
Kasungu  0.107  0.003  0.119  0.003  0.056  0.005 
Salima  0.048  0.002  0.053  0.002  0.028  0.004 
Lilongwe (capital)  0.229  0.004  0.219  0.004  0.270  0.010 
Machinga  0.191  0.004  0.198  0.004  0.165  0.008 
Blantyre  0.212  0.004  0.195  0.004  0.286  0.010 
Ngabu  0.064  0.002  0.073  0.003  0.028  0.004 
Type of settlement   
Major Urban areas  0.128  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.667  0.010 
Boma/Large Urban areas  0.018  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.092  0.006 
Small Urban areas  0.046  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.241  0.009 
Rural areas  0.809  0.004  1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Number of observations  11,219  9,071 2,148   39
  
Table 2: Test 1: Ordered probits for satisfaction with life based on equation (8) 
 
  (1) (2) 
   Coefficient  Std. error  Coefficient   Std. error 
Log real consumption per person (logC) 0.702**  0.250  1.822***  0.338 
Log leave-out mean C in the locality   0.361  0.249  1.480***  0.331 
Interaction of logC with leave-out mean  -0.042*  0.025  -0.145***  0.033 
Household size (N) 0.051**  0.017  0.077***  0.018 
N
2 -0.002*  0.001  -0.003*  0.001 
Share of children  0.116  0.077  -0.138*  0.081 
Share of elderly  0.057  0.080  -0.023  0.084 
Share of adult women  0.081  0.071  -0.035  0.074 
Share of adult men    Reference category   
Share of employed  0.122*  0.054  -0.126*  0.059 
Female household head  -0.093**  0.029  -0.081**  0.030 
Age of Household Head  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001 
Agricultural household  0.197***  0.040  0.080*  0.045 
Household has an enterprise  0.014  0.022  0.068**  0.024 
Household has an unemployed person  0.054  0.086  -0.133  0.093 
Education of the head       
Pre-school -0.156*  0.092  -0.047  0.097 
Junior Primary  -0.069  0.091  0.032  0.096 
Senior Primary  -0.015  0.089  0.089  0.095 
Junior Secondary  -0.117  0.115  -0.068  0.121 
Senior Secondary  -0.013  0.088  0.105  0.094 
University    Reference category   
Lilongwe (Capital City)    Reference category   
Karonga 0.251***  0.056  n.a.   
Mzuzu 0.120**  0.038  n.a.   
Kasungu -0.198***  0.038  n.a.   
Salima -0.145**  0.053  n.a.   
Machinga 0.164***  0.032  n.a.   
Blantyre -0.132***  0.031  n.a.   
Ngabu 0.028  0.047  n.a.   
Major Urban areas    Reference category   
Boma/Large Urban areas  0.366***  0.083  n.a.   
Small Urban areas  0.185**  0.058  n.a.   
Rural areas  -0.195***  0.042  n.a.   
Traditional authorities dummy variables?  NO    YES   
Cut 1  5.898*  2.468  17.132***  3.380 
Cut 2  6.949**  2.468  18.418***  3.381 
Cut 3  7.355**  2.468  18.905***  3.381 
Cut 4  8.266***  2.468  19.952***  3.381 
Pseudo-R2 0.020  0.138 
Note: 
* is significant at 10% level; 
** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. N=11,219.   40
Table 3: Rural-urban split for Test 1 
 
  Rural Urban 
  (1) (2)  (1)  (2) 
   Coeff.  Std. 
error  Coeff.  Std. 
error  Coeff.   Std. 
error  Coeff.   Std. 
error 
Log C 2.057***  0.433  2.540*** 0.485  -0.322  0.559  2.142**  0.731 
Log leave-
out mean   1.717***  0.425  2.206*** 0.482  -0.812  0.553  1.327*   0.724 
Interaction   -0.181***  0.044  -0.220*** 0.049  0.061  0.053  -0.165*   0.069 
N 9,071    9,071    2,148    2,148   
Pseudo-R2 0.013    0.121    0.060    0.189   




Table 4: Average satisfaction with life by self-rated own economic welfare and assessed 
welfare of friends and neighbors (Test 2; non-parametric) 
 
Own economic ranking (OEW)  
Mean SWL 
1  (poorest)  2 3 4 5    Total 
         
1 (poorest)  2.057 2.367 3.071 2.933  n.a.  2.153 
2  2.176  2.600 2.827 3.022  n.a.  2.465 
3  2.130 2.548 2.945 2.932  n.a.  2.567 















5  2.405 2.569 2.911 3.205 3.348 2.746 
          
1 (poorest)  2.068 2.419 2.894 3.524  n.a.  2.217 
2  2.143  2.590 2.891 2.860  n.a.  2.468 
3  2.348 2.609 2.770 3.174 3.538 2.627 

















5  2.282 2.600 3.200 3.273  n.a. 2.833 
 
Total  2.124 2.550 2.905 3.076 3.441 2.426 
    Economic ranking of neighbors (NEW)   
1 (poorest)  2.125 2.139 2.453 2.800 2.579 2.153 
2  2.279  2.491 2.651 2.794 2.645 2.465 
3  2.402 2.552 2.566 3.088 2.714 2.567 















5  2.481 2.633 2.797 2.816 3.137 2.746 
  Total  2.217 2.468 2.627 2.875 2.833 2.426 
Note: SWL is self-assessed on a scale from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied).  Means not reported when less 
that 12 sample points.   41
Table 5: Test 2: Ordered probits for satisfaction with life based on equation (9)  
 
  (1) (2) 
   Coefficient   Std. error  Coefficient   Std. error 
Own economic welfare (OEW)  0.424***  0.035  0.582***  0.038 
Friends’ economic welfare (FEW)   0.076**  0.025  0.102***  0.027 
Neighbors’ economic welfare (NEW) 0.110***  0.031  0.041  0.033 
OEW.FEW  -0.032**  0.012  -0.055***  0.013 
OEW.NEW -0.023  0.014  -0.016  0.015 
Household size (N) -0.020  0.017  -0.026  0.017 
N
2 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Share of children  0.021  0.076  -0.235**  0.080 
Share of elderly  0.029  0.080  -0.056  0.084 
Share of adult women  0.045  0.071  -0.077  0.074 
Share of adult men (reference)      
Share of employed  0.129*  0.054  -0.081  0.059 
Female household head  -0.092**  0.029  -0.062*  0.030 
Age of Household Head  0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001 
Agricultural household  0.214***  0.040  0.071  0.045 
Household has an enterprise  0.020  0.022  0.065**  0.024 
Household has an unemployed person  0.071  0.086  -0.114  0.093 
Education of the head       
Pre-school -0.022  0.087  0.107  0.096 
Junior Primary  0.053  0.086  0.177*  0.095 
Senior Primary  0.082  0.084  0.206*  0.093 
Junior Secondary  -0.020  0.112  0.046  0.120 
Senior Secondary  0.026  0.085  0.173*  0.093 
University (reference)      
Lilongwe (Capital City) (reference)      
Karonga 0.185***  0.056  n.a.   
Mzuzu 0.001  0.038  n.a.   
Kasungu -0.233***  0.038  n.a.   
Salima -0.055  0.054  n.a.   
Machinga 0.084**  0.031  n.a.   
Blantyre -0.130***  0.031  n.a.   
Ngabu 0.108*  0.046  n.a.   
Major Urban areas (reference)  n.a.     
Boma/Large Urban areas  0.412***  0.083  n.a.   
Small Urban areas  0.197***  0.058  n.a.   
Rural areas  -0.163***  0.039  n.a.   
Traditional authorities dummy variables? NO    YES   
Cut1 0.260*  0.122  17.132***  3.380 
Cut2 1.331***  0.122  18.418***  3.381 
Cut3 1.748***  0.123  18.905***  3.381 
Cut4 2.682***  0.124  19.952***  3.381 
Pseudo-R2 0.033  0.138 
Note: 
* is significant at 10% level; 
** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. N=11,219.   42




















 Value  Std. error  Value  Std. error  Value  Std. error 
  (1) Model without TA dummies 
1  0.369***  0.024  0.044**  0.016  0.087***  0.019 
2  0.313***  0.017  0.011  0.012  0.064***  0.013 
3  0.258***  0.018  -0.021  0.018  0.041**  0.019 
4  0.203***  0.028  -0.054*  0.028  0.018  0.031 
5  0.147***  0.039  -0.086*  0.039  -0.005  0.044 
  (2) Model with TA dummies 
1  0.511***  0.026  0.047**  0.017  0.026  0.020 
2  0.441***  0.018  -0.007  0.013  0.010  0.014 
3  0.370***  0.020  -0.062***  0.019  -0.006  0.021 
4  0.300***  0.030  -0.117***  0.029  -0.022  0.033 
5  0.229***  0.042  -0.172***  0.041  -0.037  0.047 
Note: 
* is significant at 10% level; 
** at 5% level; 




Table 7: Rural-urban split for Test 2 
 
  Rural Urban 
  (1) (2)  (1)  (2) 
   Coeff.  Std. 
error  Coeff.  Std. 
error  Coeff.   Std. 
error  Coeff.   Std. 
error 
OEW  0.491***  0.042  0.575***  0.045  0.423***  0.079  0.458***  0.087 
FEW   0.137***  0.036  0.023  0.039  0.108  0.066  -0.000  0.071 
NEW  0.117***  0.028  0.112***  0.030  -0.013  0.061  0.036  0.065 
OEW.FEW  -0.046**  0.014  -0.053***  0.015  -0.026  0.025  -0.038  0.026 
OEW.NEW -0.038*  0.017  -0.005  0.018  -0.019  0.027  -0.007  0.029 
N 9,071    9,071    2,148    2,148   
Pseudo-R2 0.028    0.137    0.069    0.191   
Note: Controls included, as in Table 5. 
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Table 8: Poverty lines for own-economic welfare holding utility constant 
 
(a) At the boundary between “unsatisfied” and “neither unsatisfied nor satisfied”  
  Neighbors (NEW) 
  1  (poorest)  2 3 4  5 
1 (poorest)  2.88 2.85 2.82 2.78  2.74 
2  2.82 2.79 2.75 2.70  2.64 
3  2.76 2.72 2.66 2.60  2.53 

















5  2.58 2.50 2.41 2.29  2.13 
(b) At the boundary between “neither unsatisfied nor satisfied” and “satisfied” 
  Neighbors (NEW) 
  1(poorest)  2 3 4  5 
1 (poorest)  4.01 4.05 4.11 4.17  4.24 
2  4.06 4.12 4.18 4.26  4.35 
3  4.13 4.20 4.27 4.37  4.48 

















5  4.31 4.42 4.55 4.72  4.93 
Note: The table gives the value OEW
* needed to compensate for each (NEW, FEW) combination holding the 
expected value of utility constant.  Controls set to mean points.   44
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